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CHRGF: PRC 05/01/84

APPRV: S/S: JCOVEY

DAFTL: FCCN: ADCNATE/P

ARDLAW

CLEAR: 1: DCM: CWFREEMAN(D)

2: EAP: PWOLFCWITZ(C)

DISTR: S/S12 AMB DCM

CHRON 12

E.C. 12356: DECL: CADR

TAGS: CVIF (REAGAN, RONALD)

SUBJECT: VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY SHULTZ AND
CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER WU MEETING, 8:30 A.M.,
DIAOYUTAI, APRIL 29, 1984

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THIS IS A VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF THE MEETING BETWEEN
U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ AND CHINESE FOREIGN
MINISTER WU XUEQIAN, HELD IN VILLA NO. 15, DIAOYUTAI,
AT 8:32 A.M., APRIL 29, 1984.

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3. CHINESE PARTICIPANTS:

WU XUEQIAN, STATE COUNCILLOR AND MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ZHANG WENJIN, CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED
STATES

PAN XU, VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JIA SHI, VICE MINISTER OF THE MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND TRADE

ZHU QIZHEN, ASSISTANT MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AI HUAIYUAN, DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION DEPART-
MENT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ZHANG WENPU, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE AMERICAN AND
OCEANIAN DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

WANG LI, CHIEF, U.S. AFFAIRS DIVISION, MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ZHA PEIXIN, DEPUTY CHIEF, U.S. AFFAIRS DIVISION,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CHINESE INTERPRETER

FOUR CHINESE HOSTESS

4. AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS:

SECRETARY SHULTZ

AMBASSADOR BUMMEL

ROBERT MCFARLANE

LIONEL OLIVER

PAUL WOLFCWITZ

RICHARD ARMITAGE

STON SIGUR

BN PUGHES

CHARLES FREEMAN

RAYMOND SEICZ

DCN ANDERSON

United States Department of State
Office of FOI, Privacy, & Classification Review
Review Authority: MartensP
Date 10/12/95
Case ID: 94-3675

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PAT WARDLAW (EMBASSY NOTETAKER)
ANDREWS D. ONATE (EMBASSY NOTETAKER)
JIM BROWN (INTERPRETER)

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VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT: BEGIN TEXT.

FOREIGN MINISTER WU: I HAVE A SUGGESTION. IN ORDER TO FINISH BEFORE 12:15 A.M., I WILL SPEAK FIRST AND WILL USE LESS THAN 45 MINUTES TO BRING UP MY QUESTIONS. THEN YOU, MR. SECRETARY, CAN SPEAK FOR 45 MINUTES.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: ALL RIGHT. SO YOU WOULD GO RIGHT THROUGH, AND WE WILL NOT INTERRUPT?

WU: WHEN YOU SPEAK, WE WILL NOT INTERRUPT.

SHULTZ: I'M SO USED TO BEING INTERRUPTED, I WON'T KNOW WHAT TO DO.

WU: IT WOULDN'T BE SO MECHANICAL. IF YOU NEED TO ASK A QUESTION, PLEASE ASK IT. IF WE NEED CLARIFICATION, WE WILL ASK.

FOREIGN MINISTER WU'S STATEMENT:

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THANK YOU, MY TIME IS UP.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY SHULTZ:

YOU LEFT ME WITH ONE-HALF THE TIME, FAIR ENOUGH.

YOUR AGENDA IS NOT MUCH DIFFERENT FROM MINE, SO I
WILL FOLLOW YOUR POINTS, BUT ADD ONE OR TWO ITEMS IN
THE BILATERAL RELATIONS.

FIRST, AS FAR AS MR. ARAFAT IS CONCERNED, OF COURSE
WE OBSERVED THE FEZ RESOLUTION, AND HAVE ATTEMPTED
TO BUILD ON IT AND CREATE THE CONDITIONS UPON WHICH
HUSSEIN CAN PARTICIPATE, BUT HE HAS NOT COME FORWARD
YET.

THE WORD, "SELF-DETERMINATION," HAS BECOME A KIND
OF CODE WORD. IT IS A PRINCIPLE PEOPLE SUBSCRIBE
TO, AND WE DO SO WITHIN LIMITS. WE FOUGHT A CIVIL
WAR IN THE U.S. WHEN A PART OF THE U.S. ATTEMPTED
SELF-DETERMINATION SO THERE ARE LIMITS. IN THE
MIDDLE EAST IT HAS COME TO BE A SORT OF CODE WORD
FOR AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE ON THE WEST
BANK, AND THIS IS NOT A WORKABLE GOVERNMENT ENTITY.
IT IS MORE SENSIBLE TO THINK OF THAT AREA AFFILIATED
WITH JORDAN. SO THIS IS WHAT IT HAS COME TO MEAN.
MR. ARAFAT KNOWS THAT.

WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ARAFAT TURN
PEACEFUL MEANS RATHER THAN USE VIOLENT METHODS

YOU CAN TELL HIM THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH WE WILL
HAVE DIRECT DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM. FIRST, HE MUST

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RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL AND SECOND, HE MUST ACKNOWLEDGE UN RESOLUTION 242 AS A BASIS FOR MOVING TOWARDS PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IF HE MAKES SUCH A DECLARATION WE ARE PREPARED FOR AN APPROPRIATE EMBASSY -- IN TUNIS -- TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS AT A TECHNICAL LEVEL TO ARRANGE A MEETING AT A POLITICAL LEVEL. A POLITICAL MEETING COULD OCCUR, WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFGYITZ OR AMBASSADOR MURPHY, AND WE CAN HAVE A DIALOGUE. MR. ARAFAT HAS A HABIT OF TAKING CREDIT FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS IN ISRAEL OR AGAINST ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES AROUND THE WORLD, AND WHEN HE DOES THAT -- GIVEN THE BACKGROUND OF THE PLO PLEDGE TO OVERTHROW ISRAEL -- IT DOES NOT IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS OF A DIALOGUE WITH US.

MAJOR CHANGES ARE TAKING PLACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY. IN LEBANON -- WHERE WE REMAIN ENGAGED AND PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL -- ALL FACTIONS SEEK OUT OUR AMBASSADOR. OF COURSE, WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF HELPING THE BUILD-UP OF SYRIAN-SOVIET FORCES, BUT WE CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON.

ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, LEBANON HAS TO FACE THE QUESTION

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OF HOW TO CONTROL SOUTHERN **UNCLASSIFIED** IT IS NOT
USED AS A PLATFORM FOR ATTACKS ON ISRAEL. THIS IS
SOMETHING LEANON MUST DO SOMETHING ABOUT.

AT THE MEANTIME, THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN ISRAEL MEANS
THAT THERE IS LITTLE OPPORTUNITY FOR NEGOTIATIONS
UNTIL IT IS OVER. BUT I SUSPECT THAT THE OUTCOME OF
THE CAMPAIGN -- WHICHEVER SIDE WINS -- WILL MEAN A
GREATER OPPORTUNITY FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

WE CONTINUE TO WORK WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA, AND
HOPE TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF LIFE
FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT
THE PALESTINIANS HAVE TAKEN A TERRIBLE BEATING IN THIS
AREA, AND THIS REMAINS A CENTRAL SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM
IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

NOW THE GREATEST SOURCE OF TENSION IN THE AREA IS THE
IRAN-IRAQ WAR. OUR POSTURE IS ONE OF NEUTRALITY.
BUT WE BELIEVE THAT IRAN POSSES THE GREATEST THREAT,
ESPECIALLY TO THIRD PARTIES NOT INVOLVED BUT WHO
DEPEND ON THE FLOW OF ENERGY RESOURCES IN THE GULF
AREA.

WE URGE YOU, AS WELL AS OTHERS, NOT TO SELL ARMS TO
IRAN, AND WE URGE YOU, AS WE OURSELVES HAVE DONE, TO
SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THAT
WAR. WE STRONGLY CONDEMN THE SOVIET UNION'S USE OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA.

NOTE:

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AS FOR THE QUESTION OF MOVING THE EMBASSY TO JERUSALEM,
PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS EXPRESSED HIMSELF FIRMLY ON THIS
ISSUE, AND HE WILL CONTINUE TO OPPOSE LEGISLATION IN
CONGRESS TO MOVE THE EMBASSY. WE BELIEVE, BEYOND
THE CONGRESSIONAL FIGHT, THAT THIS IS NOT A PREROGA-
TIVE OF THE CONGRESS, TO TELL THE PRESIDENT WHERE
TO LOCATE THE EMBASSY. THE CONSTITUTION GIVES THE
PRESIDENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN
POLICY, AND PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL NOT MOVE THE EMBASSY
TO JERUSALEM UNDER PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES. WE
WOULD LIKE TO SEE A NEGOTIATED ARRANGEMENT FOR JERUSALEM
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES, BUT FOR NOW, WE
WILL NOT MOVE IT.

ON SOUTH AFRICA, WE AGREE -- AND PUBLICLY HAVE SAID
SO MANY TIMES -- WE ABHOR THE APARTHEID SYSTEM OF
SOUTH AFRICA, AND WANT TO SEE IT CHANGED. THE WAY
TO BRING THIS ABOUT IS TO ENGAGE OURSELVES WITH SOUTH
AFRICA, NOT ONLY ON THIS PROBLEM, BUT TO RELAX THE
TENSION AND TURMOIL IN SOUTH AFRICA. SOUTHERN AFRICA
HAS TO BE LOOKED ON AS A REGION, BECAUSE OF THE
DEPENDENCY OF THE REGION'S ECONOMIES ON THE SOUTH
AFRICAN ECONOMY.

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WE HAVE WORKED HARD IN THIS WHOLE AREA, AND HAVE HELPED QUITE A BIT IN BRINGING ABOUT AN ACCORD BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA, AND THE TENTATIVE FIRST STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ANGOLA THEIR DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WHICH THEY HAVE ASKED US TO HELP MONITOR.

AS PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID YESTERDAY: WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT UN RESOLUTION 435 AS IT APPLIES TO NAMIBIA, AND WHILE THE ISSUE STANDS ON ITS OWN MERITS, THE REALITY IS THAT SOUTH AFRICA WILL NOT GO FOR THAT AS LONG AS SOVIET PRESSURE IN ANGOLA THROUGH CUBAN TFOOPS EXISTS. SO WE DON'T GET WHAT THE UN WANTS, BUT WE GET WHAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTS. WE SEE SOME PROGRESS IN GETTING THE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA TO CONFRONT THE PROBLEM OF CUBA'S WITHDRAWAL, WHICH IS THE KEY TO BRINGING ABOUT WHAT WE ALL WANT. THE ISSUE TURNS MORE ON UNITA AND JOSEPH SAVIMBI THAN ON SOUTH AFRICA AS FAR AS ANGOLA IS CONCERNED. SAVIMBI IS A POWERFUL FORCE IN ANGOLA, AND AT SOME POINT THERE MUST BE A RECONCILIATION IN ANGOLA IN ORDER FOR STABILITY TO RETURN TO THAT COUNTRY. WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE EFFORTS OF OUR DIPLOMATS, AND THESE EFFORTS

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ARE BEARING FRUIT THERE. IN THE LONG RUN, APARTHEID IS NOT AN ACCEPTABLE WAY TO LOOK AT RACIAL PROBLEMS IN ANY COUNTRY.

YOU DID NOT MENTION CENTRAL AMERICA, BUT LET ME MAKE A COUPLE OF POINTS.

FIRST, AN IMPORTANT ELECTION WILL TAKE PLACE IN EL SALVADOR ON MAY 6, AND IT MAY BE AS A RESULT OF THAT THAT A BETTER SITUATION CAN BE CREATED IN THAT COUNTRY. IN THE MEANTIME, WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE CONTADOR NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THE KEY PROBLEM IS NICARAGUA, THE MILITARY BUILD-UP IN NICARAGUA, AND THE EFFORTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA TO USE NICARAGUA AS A BASE TO DESTABILIZE OTHER COUNTRIES. THERE IS NO DOUBT WHERE THE COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTER IS IN NICARAGUA. WE KNOW WHERE IT IS, HOW IT OPERATES, AND IT IS THERE.

I SAY TO YOU, YOU SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT, IN THE END THE U.S. WILL NOT ALLOW THE SOVIET UNION TO USE MILITARY MEANS TO GAIN ADDITIONAL BASES OR POSITIONS OF STRENGTH IN CENTRAL AMERICA OR IN THIS HEMISPHERE. WE WILL NOT GO ALONG WITH THAT AT ALL.

WE DON'T HAVE TIME FOR EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS ON ARMS CONTROL, BUT I DO WANT TO SAY THAT THE U.S. IS ENGAGING THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHERS IN A WIDE ARRAY OF DISCUSSIONS ON ARMS CONTROL. MOST OF OUR DISCUSSIONS ARE MAKING PROGRESS, EXCEPT THE TWO INVOLVING NUCLEAR TALKS.

THE U.S. POSITION IS REASONABLE, AND WE ARE READY FOR GIVE AND TAKE IN OUR DISCUSSIONS. BUT WE WILL NOT ACCEDE TO UNREASONABLE DEMANDS FOR THE SAKE OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT. WE MUST LOOK TO THE INTERESTS OF OUR FRIENDS. IN INF TALKS, OUR POSITION WILL TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION GLOBAL INTERESTS.

WE THINK THAT IT IS VERY WORTHWHILE TO SHARE OUR VIEWS ON ARMS CONTROL WITH YOU, AND ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU. MAYBE A VISIT BY KENNETH ADELMAN, THE DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WILL BE A WAY TO CONTINUE THIS DISCUSSION. IF YOU AGREE, THE AMBASSADOR CAN HELP MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS VISIT. (NOTE: IN AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN STAFF IT WAS NOTED THAT THE CHINESE SIDE AGREED TO THE VISIT AND WOULD WORK OUT DATES WITH THE EMBASSY.)

MR. MCFARLANE IS HERE WITH US, AND HE IS NOT ONLY THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, BUT HE IS ALSO ONE OF THE GENUINE EXPERTS ON ARMS CONTROL IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. IF YOU WANT, BOB, PLEASE GO AHEAD AND ADD TO MY REMARKS.

MCFARLANE: THE SECRETARY HAS COVERED THE U.S. APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL VERY WELL CONCEPTUALLY.

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ALL OF US ARE GRATIFIED IN THE INTEREST THAT THE CHINESE HAVE SHOWN, AND THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THIS INTEREST IS IN CHINA JOINING THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, AND THROUGH CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE GENEVA TALKS. THIS REFLECTS WHAT WE BOTH UNDERSTAND, THAT IMPROVING STABILITY IS ESSENTIAL. ARMS CONTROL IS IMPORTANT, AND TALKS WITH ADELMAN CAN BE HELPFUL.

SFULTZ: I WANT TO MAKE ONE MORE POINT BEFORE TURNING TO BILATERAL ISSUES. ON KOREA, THE LATE KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER LEE WAS A FRIEND OF MINE. HE WAS A GOOD MAN, AND I GOT TO KNOW HIM VERY WELL. MY WIFE KNEW HIS WIFE, AND I CALLED ON HIM THE LAST TIME I WAS IN SOUTH KOREA.

IF IT IS HARD FOR ME, IT IS EVEN HARDER FOR THE SOUTH KOREANS. IT WAS A MASSIVE TRAGEDY. I JUST ADD THIS AS A COMMENT.

LET ME SAY THIS ABOUT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

FIRST, I AGREE WITH YOU ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EXCHANGE OF VISITS AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, THE PREMIER

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 VISITING THE U.S. IN JANUARY. THE PRESIDENT NOW. THESE VISITS ARE INVALUABLE FOR SETTING THE TONE AND ESTABLISHING THE MOMENTUM FOR OUR RELATIONS. AND I WILL ASSURE YOU THAT I WILL GIVE MY ATTENTION TO ALL THE ISSUES YOU RAISED HERE TODAY. A GOOD RELATIONSHIP IS FUNDAMENTALLY A REFLECTION OF THE SUBSTANCE THAT IS GOING ON. ATMOSPHERICS DON'T GET YOU VERY FAR, SUBSTANCE DOES.

ON ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN, WE HAVE NOTED YOUR COMMENTS. I THINK MY BEST COURSE IS TO SIMPLY SAY TO YOU: WE UNDERTOOK THESE COMMITMENTS IN THE VARIOUS COMMUNIQUE AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. THE LAST ONE I WORKED ON WITH THE PRESIDENT AND WITH MR. MCFARLANE, AND WE KNEW WHAT WE WERE GETTING INTO. WE WILL LIVE UP TO THOSE COMMITMENTS, JUST AS WE EXPECT YOU TO LIVE UP TO YOUR COMMITMENTS.

WE ARE TRYING TO TAKE A CHINESE VIEW OF THIS MATTER. IN THE IMMEDIATE PERIOD WE BOTH MUST ACT CONSISTENTLY WITH OUR COMMITMENTS IN THE COMMUNIQUE. IN THE LONG-RUN GREAT PATIENCE OVER A LONG PERIOD IS ESSENTIAL. IN THE END, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE CHINESE THEMSELVES -- WHETHER IN TAIWAN OR THE PRC -- RESOLVE THIS ISSUE PEACEFULLY. WE HOPE THIS WILL HAPPEN. ON THE TWO INCIDENTS YOU MENTIONED, LET ME SAY THAT FIRST, RUDENESS IS NOT EXCUSABLE. THERE IS NO REASON FOR OUR CUSTOMS OFFICIALS TO TREAT ANYONE RUDELY.

ON THE OTHER HAND, I WOULD BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION THAT THE U.S. IS A VERY OPEN COUNTRY, AND GIVES ACCESS TO TRAINEES AND OTHER VISITORS TO OUR FACILITIES, ESPECIALLY THOSE INVOLVED WITH HIGH TECHNOLOGY. WE ROUTINELY INSPECT, WHETHER IT IS CHINA OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY, BAGGAGE AS PEOPLE LEAVE THE COUNTRY. THIS IS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST ANY INDIVIDUAL OR COUNTRY, BUT IT IS JUST AS YOU ROUTINELY INSPECT BAGGAGE SO THAT NO ONE TAKES OUT YOUR VALUABLE ARTIFACTS.

IN SOME CASES, WE HAVE FOUND DOCUMENTS AND OTHER MATERIALS THAT VIOLATE OUR EXPORT CONTROL LAWS. YOUR CASES SOUND VERY ROUTINE, AND IF TRUE, THEY WILL BE CHECKED OUT AND THE MATERIALS RETURNED. WHEN DOCUMENTS OF THIS SORT ARE TAKEN OUT OF THE U.S., YOU SHOULD HAVE THEM STAMPED OR CERTIFIED IN ADVANCE. OUR CUSTOMS, LIKE BUREAUCRACIES ALL OVER, HAVE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT THEY MUST FOLLOW, AND THEY DON'T HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF DISCRETION TO EXERCISE.

ON THE QUESTION OF THE OPENING OF THE CONSULATES GENERAL, WE TOO ARE ANXIOUS TO OPEN THEM, BUT IT MUST BE DONE ON A SYMMETRICAL BASIS, THAT IS, THE OPENING OF OUR FACILITIES AND CAPABILITIES HERE FOR US MUST BE PARALLEL TO YOURS IN CHICAGO. MANY CONSULAR PROBLEMS THAT ARISE ARE NATURAL BECAUSE THERE IS MORE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE IN OUR TWO COUNTRIES NOW. THIS PROBLEM DESERVES OUR ATTENTION BECAUSE IF WE ALLOW IT TO Fester IT WILL CAUSE ILL FEELINGS. WE

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WE WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM FURTHER. WE COULD HAVE JOAN CLARK, OUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS, COME TO CHINA, OR YOU COULD CONSULT WITH THE AMBASSADOR TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. BOTH COUNTRIES MUST PUSH HARD TO PUT THE IMPLEMENTING TAILS BEHIND US.

THE AMBASSADOR HAS ASKED TO DELIVER ONE SENTENCE ON THE SITUATION WITH OUR CONSULATE IN CHENGDU. MR. AMBASSADOR.

AMBASSADOR HUMMEL: WE ARE BEING ASKED BY THE AUTHORITIES IN CHENGDU TO SET A DATE IN BOTH CHENGDU AND CHICAGO FOR THE OPENING OF THE CONSULATES, AND THAT UNTIL WE SET THAT DATE, THE AUTHORITIES IN CHENGDU HAVE SAID THAT NO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ARE POSSIBLE. THIS IS AN IMPOSSIBLE CONDITION, SINCE WE CANNOT SET A DATE UNTIL WE KNOW WHEN FACILITIES IN CHENGDU CAN BE CONSTRUCTED.

SECRETARY SEULTZ: ON EXIMBANK CREDITS, WE APPROACH EACH REQUEST ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, AND THERE IS NO REASON TO EXPECT ANYTHING BUT READINESS ON OUR PART TO CONSIDER YOUR PROPOSALS. EXIMBANK FOLLOWS

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OECD BATES -- WHICH ARE NOT AS YOU MIGHT THINK -- PUT IN A NONDISCRIMINATORY FASHION CHINA WILL GET ALL DUE CONSIDERATION BY EXIMBANK. ON THE U.S. DOLS 52 MILLION IS-HE. IT CAN BE DONE BY PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER, AND THERE IS NO PROBLEM WITH HIS IN PRINCIPLE. IF WE CAN GET FOREIGN ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION FINALLY PASSED, THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEMS.

ON THE CENTRIFUGE SEPARATOR, THE EXTENT OF CONTROLS WE REQUIRE ON SENSITIVE ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE WOULD BE UNIMAGINABLE BY CHINESE STANDARDS. AMBASSADOR RICHARD KENNEDY MADE THIS CLEAR IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU, AND IT IS SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED BY ARTICLE TWO OF THE NUCLEAR AGREEMENT TO BE INITIALLED ON MONDAY. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY ARRIVES IN BEIJING THIS AFTERNOON, AND YOU CAN DISCUSS THE MATTER MORE FULLY WITH HIM, ALTHOUGH IT IS VERY UNLIKELY THAT SUCH A SALE CAN BE ARRANGED.

ON THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY ISSUE, WE CAN AGREE THAT THIS IS A MAJOR AREA OF ACHIEVEMENT. WE HAVE RECEIVED YOUR PAPERS AND WILL STUDY THEM. THIS IS AN AREA WE WANT TO WORK ON, PARTICULARLY CCCOM, WHICH YOU DID NOT MENTION. THIS IS SOMETHING WE WANT TO GO SMOOTHLY.

ON GSP, THERE IS LEGISLATION TO SEEK RENEWAL IN THE CONGRESS. THIS WILL BE DIFFICULT. I THINK IT "PIPES AT THE END OF 1995. GATT REQUIREMENT IS NOT DIRECTED AT CHINA, BUT RATHER AT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MARKET AND NON-MARKET ECONOMIES. I WILL ASK MR. OLMER TO WRITE SOMETHING ABOUT THIS ISSUE AS WELL AS THE MARITIME ISSUE YOU MENTIONED BEFORE WE LEAVE CHINA.

FINALLY, I URGE YOU TO WORK WITH US ON THE HUGUANG ECND ISSUE, AND HAVE PATIENCE WITH OUR SYSTEM. OUR PREVIOUS INTERVENTION WORKED, BUT I RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEMS YOU HAVE HAD WITH IT. BUT WE WORKED TOGETHER, AND WE SEEM TO BE ON THE WAY TOWARD RESOLVING IT. I URGE YOU TO STICK WITH THIS PROCESS.

I DON'T WANT TO MISS MY PLANE.

WU: ALTHOUGH I HAVE SOME COMMENTS ON SOME OF YOUR REMARKS, THERE IS NO TIME FOR THEM. HAN XU WILL MAKE SOME OF THESE POINTS ON THE PLANE TO XI'AN OR LATER.

THANK YOU, AND HAVE A GOOD FLIGHT.

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